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Crimes Against Cultural Heritage in Timbuktu 
 
On the 3rd March 2016, Ahmed Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi sat in a courtroom at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. He stated that he was a 
Tuareg/Tamachek man of about 40 years of age, born in a village near 
Timbuktu. He also stated that he wanted to be addressed in Arabic and that 
he understood the accusations made against him. He is facing charges of 
directing attacks against nine mausoleums and the Sidi Yahia mosque in 
Timbuktu1 and has became the first person in the history of the ICC to be 
prosecuted for the destruction of cultural sites. He is also the first person in 
the Court’s history to plead guilty. His trial will take place on the 22nd August 
2016. 
 
Al-Mahdi (also known as Abou Tourab) is a member of the Islamic extremist 
group Ansar Dine, and allegedly part of the group’s Islamic police and head of 
‘Hesba’, a morality brigade. Ansar Dine, together with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) occupied Timbuktu in 2012. A military coup in the capital 
Bamako in March 2012 gave rise to the conditions for the occupation by the 
radical Islamists, who, in alliance with Tuareg rebels, captured large parts of 
northern Mali in the name of a Tuareg homeland (Azawad) and in order to 
impose of a ‘pure’ form of Islam on the population. 
 
The atrocities in the north of Mali were well covered by the international press 
because of the brutality of the extremists and the banning of music in a 
location well known for its festival in the desert. The extremists also destroyed 
ancient manuscripts housed in the Ahmed Baba Centre. The attacks could 
therefore be seen as targeting a uniquely African intellectual tradition. 
 
The court proceedings in The Hague are taking place against a backdrop of a 
precarious peace plan for Mali, the ‘Accord D’Alger’, signed in 2015.  The 
accord has been criticised because of the lack of representativeness of its 
                                                
1	The	 before	 and	 after	 photos	 of	 the	 damaged	monuments	 can	 be	 found	 at:	 https://www.icc-
signatories, Bamako’s limited perceived legitimacy in the north, persistent 
insecurity and the absence of transitional justice and reconciliation procedures 
(Pezard & Shurkin, 2015). Matters are further complicated by the ongoing 
battle for control over lucrative illegal trade routes in the north of Mali 
(cocaine, arms, tobacco, people smuggling) and of particular relevance in the 
case of Al-Mahdi, a battle over the appropriate form of Islam found in Mali.  
 
In March 2015, The Worldwide Movement for Human Rights asked the ICC to 
widen the charges against Al-Mahdi to include torture, arbitrary detentions, 
rape, forced marriage, sexual slavery and other sexual violence. For now, the 
ICC is limiting its charges to the destructions of religious sites. In reference to 
the events, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, explained: 
 
“Let us be clear: what is at stake is not just walls and stones. The 
destroyed mausoleums were important, from a religious point of view, 
from an historical point of view, and from an identity point of view”3 
 
Since 1988, Timbuktu’s mosques and mausoleums have been on UNESCO’s 
World Heritage List and are therefore not only powerful local religious sites 
but have become symbols of a universalist humanist western discourse about 
identity. As the Director General of UNESCO, Irena Bokova, commented at 
the time of the launch of a fund for the rehabilitation of Mali’s cultural heritage 
in 2013: 
 
“When a world heritage site is destroyed because of stupidity and 
violence the whole of humanity feels that it has been deprived of part of 
itself, that it has been injured”4 
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The masons in Timbuktu have since restored the destroyed mausoleums and 
repaired the mosque using UNESCO funds. A ceremony was held in 2015 to 
re-consecrate the sites and hand back the keys to their traditional owners. 
 
Why now? 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was a 
United Nations law court set up in 1993 to investigate the crimes that took 
place during the conflict in the Balkans, including the destruction of cultural 
heritage. Due to limited remit of the ICTY, the need for a permanent, treaty 
based, international criminal court was identified. Since the ICC’s creation in 
2002, war criminals can be tried personally for destructive acts against 
cultural heritage. 
 
The international outcry following the destructions in Timbuktu came after 
UNESCO’s and other international bodies’ powerlessness in the face of high 
profile ‘performative’ destructions of cultural heritage around the world. These 
include the 2001 destructions of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan by 
the Taliban, the attacks against the Mosul museum and at Nimrud in Iraq in 
2015 by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and recent 
destructions in Palmyra, Syria, again by ISIL. It is therefore important to 
UNESCO for the ICC to make an example of the Timbuktu case in order to 
assert the institution’s credibility as a defender of global cultural heritage.  
 
It is not surprising that the first ‘crimes against cultural heritage’ to be tried at 
the ICC are crimes against a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The destructions 
can be seen to be about both the forms of Islam that are considered legitimate 
and the forms of global politics that are considered legitimate. According to a 
BBC journalist at the time of the destructions, an Ansar Dine spokesman, 
Sanda Ould Boumama, told the AFP news agency the mausoleums would be 
destroyed, "all of them, without exception. God is unique. All of this is haram 
(forbidden in Islam). We are all Muslims. UNESCO is what?"5 
 
Islam in Mali  
 
Timbuktu is known as the City of 333 Saints and during its golden age in the 
15th and 16th centuries was a centre for Islamic learning. Despite this rich 
history, the site is viewed as idolatrous by Islamic extremists. The 
worshipping of mausoleums in Timbuktu and across Mali is part of a Sufi 
tradition in Islam. Children in Timbuktu and Djenné (Timbuktu’s sister city) 
attend Qur’anic schools and learn to recite the Qur’an by heart, usually 
without learning Arabic. In this way, they learn to be Muslim through 
embodied practice. Marabouts (religious teachers) engage in petitionary 
prayer and the preparation of amulets to ward off danger. These practices, as 
well as the performance of music, sport and many interdictions around dress 
and sexual conduct were all reasons for the brutal assaults by Ansar Dine and 
AQIM on the populations in northern Mali.  
 
The international community has historically seen Mali as a bulwark against 
radical Islam (Soares, 2005). The distinction between so-called ‘Black Islam’ 
found in Mali and so-called ‘Mediterranean Islam’ (brought over from the Arab 
peninsula), was noted as early as 1906 by Robert Arnaud, the director of the 
French Colonial Office of Muslim Affairs (Badru, 2006). Arnaud stated that the 
French colonial administration would do well to support ‘Black Islam’ in Mali 
as he considered it less dangerous to the colonial agenda than 
‘Mediterranean Islam’. 
 
Throughout Mali’s history, jihads and counter-jihads have led to the 
destruction and rebuilding of mosques, in Timbuktu and in Djenné. In Djenné, 
the current Great Mosque is the third to be built on the central site and the 
small neighbourhood mosques that were once found around the town have all 
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been destroyed (Bourgeois, 1989). In this context, the reconstruction of the 
Timbuktu shrines and mosque with UNESCO money is yet another chapter in 
this history. For the ICC and UNESCO however, the destructions in Timbuktu 
in 2012 are the latest attacks by Islamic extremists on global cultural heritage.  
 
UNESCO in Mali 
 
In previously published work (2013), I chart the rise of recognition of cultural 
heritage by UNESCO in post-colonial Mali. Before UNESCO recognition, 
Mali’s iconic mud brick architecture had been part of the French psyche due 
to the writings of early European explorers, iconic postcards and the 
reproduction of the Mosque and a typical Djenné street at the International 
Colonial Exhibition in Vincennes in 1931. Mali also has a strong international 
reputation for its photography and its music and before the events of 2012 
was a popular destination for cultural tourism. The destruction of tourism in 
Mali, in common with large parts of North Africa, has been a deliberate and 
devastating part of the extremists’ strategy. 
 
The declaration of three UNESCO World Heritage sites in Mali in 1988 and 
19896 was largely due to the interests of Mali’s ex-President, Alpha Oumar 
Konaré, who is a trained archaeologist and who has excavated at the site of 
Djenné-Djeno (next to the current town of Djenné). He acted as consultant for 
UNESCO (1981–92) and as President of the International Council of 
Museums (1989–92). He also became involved in an international effort to 
stop the looting of Mali’s cultural heritage – a looting he equated with poverty. 
He stated that archaeological objects, like the young men of his country, were 
being dispersed around the world because Mali lacked the material means to 
keep them in situ (Konaré, 1995). This theme, of the conflation of people and 
objects, legitimately or illegitimately in or out of place, is part of the logic of 
UNESCO’s World Heritage Project. Two of Mali’s World Heritage sites, 
Timbuktu and the Tomb of Askia in Gao (declared a World Heritage site in 
2004) are in the north of the country, thus enfranchising under Malian national 
                                                
6	Timbuktu,	Djenné	and	Cliff	of	Bandiagara	(Land	of	the	Dogons)	
identity parts of the country that have been subject to Tuareg/Tamachek 
demands for self-determination.  
 
UNESCO, like anthropologists, has long wrestled with the tension between 
universalism and relativism (Hylland-Eriksen, 2001). For example, through 
looking at Claude Levi-Strauss’s relationship with UNESCO, one can chart a 
shift away from a call of universalism towards one of respect for difference 
(Joy, 2016). From its early post-war ambition of developing a global 
educational curriculum that would remove the possibility of human suffering 
on the scale seen during the Second World War, UNESCO has gradually 
moved towards a respectful ambivalence in the face of difference, even if the 
difference at times challenges the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The unifying element of all the sites found on UNESCO’s World Heritage List 
is ‘Outstanding Universal Value’, a slippery concept that describes sites that 
are ‘so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries’ and of importance for 
‘present and future generations of all humanity’. UNESCO’s concern is not 
just for the here and now. It is also for a future humanity, not yet in existence, 
whose needs are thought to be fathomable by those present today and will 
include the need for a rich cultural heritage in order to flourish.  
 
The destruction of people and the destruction of things 
 
In 1990, long before the events of 2012, Timbuktu had already been put on 
UNESCO’s list of ‘World Heritage in Danger’. A committee of experts 
identified the threat of sand encroachment, a need to structurally consolidate 
the Djingareiber Mosque and to improve its terrace rainwater drainage 
systems. UNESCO found US$45,138 to carry out the work. A further 
US$40,000 dollars was found in 1995 to fund a ICCROM/CRATerre 
restoration project. In 2005, after yet another technical assessment, Timbuktu 
was removed from the list of ‘World Heritage in Danger’ only to find itself back 
on it in 2012 where it has since remained.  
 
UNESCO officials are very concerned with the material detail of the sites 
under its jurisdiction – in the case of Timbuktu and Djenné, the architectural 
techniques used, the size and shape of the bricks and the mix of ingredients 
that make up the mud bricks and the mud for rendering. This attention to 
detail is premised on a belief in ‘authenticity’ and the ‘integrity’ of a site. 
UNESCO conceptualises the sites of Timbuktu and Djenné like monuments to 
be preserved. This has caused some tension in the past, for example in 
Djenné, UNESCO officials strongly objected to the Imam’s wishes to improve 
the Mosque by beautifying it with tiles and a new gate.  
 
The biggest factor in the problems facing Timbuktu and Djenné has been 
extreme poverty and the inability of people to pay for the upkeep of their built 
environment (Joy, 2013).  Cultural heritage projects have acted as both the 
catalyst and the proxy for much needed economic aid. By prioritising the 
protection of cultural heritage, UNESCO has mostly airbrushed out the lives of 
extreme poverty and poor sanitary conditions faced by the inhabitants of the 
sites. This causes grievances among the local population on a number of 
levels. First, there is the perception that the ‘heritage elite’ benefit 
disproportionately from the money being given in the name of cultural heritage 
and second, that the more pressing problem of economic marginality is being 
ignored. 
 
A 2015 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report found that: 
 
“Poverty and under-development create grievances that can easily be 
exploited by extremist groups, especially when such factors are 
combined with poor governance and the absence of even basic service 
delivery… the nexus between literacy, numeracy and the growth of 
radicalization has been observed in many areas across sub-Saharan 
Africa… This situation is aggravated by high-levels of unemployment, 
leaving many youth frustrated, lacking in viable prospects for the future 
and available for relatively easy recruitment into extremist groups, 
especially since most groups offer financial incentives and provide a 
sense of purpose.” (UNDP, 2015, my emphasis) 
 
In March 2015, UNESCO launched a ‘Unite4heritage’ campaign in order to try 
and harness its own sense of purpose. It appeals to people all over the world 
to stand up to extremism by showing their support on-line (through selfies and 
social media). It prompts people to “stand up against extremism and 
radicalization by celebrating the places, objects and cultural traditions that 
make the world such a rich and vibrant place”.9 
 
However cultural heritage will always be vulnerable where people are 
vulnerable, as is the case for the looting of archaeological sites. As a young 
guide said to me in Djenné in 2004 at the time of the visit of the then-
President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) “I don’t need ATT, my ATT are the 
tourists” (Joy, 2011). If states are too weak or not motivated to provide 
meaningful livelihoods for people, other forces will step in. 
 
What is a crime against cultural heritage? 
 
The challenge for anthropologists studying material culture is to decide how to 
think about the Al-Mahdi trial. Does it matter if the same attention would not 
be given to the destruction of cultural heritage without the backdrop of war 
and damage to people? What are the moral consequences of conflating the 
destruction of people with the destruction of things? If a site can be restored 
and re-consecrated, what are the long-term material consequences of the 
destruction? Is the anxiety about authenticity of the site (brick shape, 
ingredients and methods used by different masons), about trauma to people 
caused by an assault on their religion, about global symbolism, or about all 
three things?  
 
In the case of Timbuktu, a dramatic change of tone has occurred in 
UNESCO’s concern for the site, from fears over sand-encroachment and 
authenticity, to a fight against global Islamic extremism. In part, the recent 
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violent damage is a validation of UNESCO’s previous concerns. Yet 
paradoxically, sites are more of a target because of their link to UNESCO.  
 
Ansar Dine’s provocative statement ‘UNESCO is what?’ at the time of the 
destructions was answered by an ICC International Arrest Warrant for Al-
Mahdi, which is in turn was countered by the kidnapping of Beatrice Stockly, a 
Swiss nun in Timbuktu in January 2016 by AQIM, who are demanding the 
release of Al-Mahdi if they are to spare her life. This series of events morally 
interweaves the lives of people and things, as if the destruction of one is 
equivalent to the destruction of the other.  
 
While material culture theory has celebrated the multiple ways in which 
people and things can be entangled, the ICC is seeking one reading of 
events. UNESCO’s acceptance of difference cannot stretch to radical 
extremism because there is a limit to difference that is reached when it 
infringes on other people’s human rights and dignity. 
 
In an interview with Janet Anderson on the 7th March 2016, Bintou Founé 
Samaké, the president of a Malian NGO ‘Women and Law in Development in 
Africa’ explained why she attended Al-Mahdi’s hearing: 
 
" Those monuments were a reference point for an entire population, an 
entire nation and even the world … It’s as if – in Jerusalem - someone 
demolished the Wailing Wall with a bulldozer. That would be the end of 
the world. So those monuments, that’s what they represent for us. It’s as 
if someone had crushed our honour, our dignity."10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10	https://justicehub.org/article/bintou-foune-samake-mali	(retrieved	9th	March	2016)	
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